TOP SECRET//SI//TALENT KEYHOLE//NOFORN

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE FORT GEORGE G. MEADE MARYLAND 20755-6000

15 January 2013

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD

THRU: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight)

SUBJECT: (U//FOUO) Report to the Intelligence Oversight Board on NSA Activities - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(U//FOUO) Except as previously reported to you or the President, or otherwise stated in the enclosure, we have no reason to believe that intelligence activities of the National Security Agency during the quarter ending 30 September 2012 were unlawful or contrary to Executive Order or Presidential Directive and thus should have been reported pursuant to Section 1.6(c) of Executive Order 12333, as amended.

(U//FOUO) The Inspector General and the General Counsel continue to exercise oversight of Agency activities by inspections, surveys, training, review of directives and guidelines, and advice and counsel.

GEORGE ELLARD Inspector General

RAJESH DE General Counsel

(U//FOUO) I concur in the report of the Inspector General and the General Counsel and hereby make it our combined report.

KETTH B. ALEXANDER General, U. S. Army Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

Encl:

Quarterly Report

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Approved for Release by NSA on 12-19-2014, FOIA Case # 70809 (Litigation)

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I.	(U) Intelligence, Counterintelligence, and Intelligence-Related Activities the	hat
	Violated Law, Regulation, or Policy and Were Substantiated during the	
	Quarter, as well as Actions Taken as a Result of the Violations	

I.A.	(U)	Intelligence	Activities	Conducted	under	Executive	Order	(E.O.)	12333
	Aut	hority							

	Authority		
	I.A.1 (U) Unintentional Targeting or Databa Persons (USPs) or Foreign Persons in	se Queries against United State the United States (b)	l) 35 -P.L. 86-36 3)-50 USC 3024(i)
	(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) During the the National Security Agency/Central Security Se As par removed and the number of active selectors was re NSA/CSS's primary tasking tools for telephone and active selectors.	rvice (NSA/CSS) continued rt of that process, duplicate selectors educed. At the end of third quarter of	were f CY2012,
	ininstances inadvertently targeted community pursuing foreign intelligence tasking or performed otherwise specified, all intercepts, query results, a required by United States SIGINT Directive SP00	ications to, from, or about USPs, while a query using a USP selector. Unless and reports have been deleted or destroyles. (b) (1) (b) (2)	le ss oyed as
	I.A.1.a. (U) Tasking Errors (1) (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) were erroneously targeted and collection oper because a collection oper because a collection operator	ction occurred. The first collection en	
(b) (1) (b) (2) (b) (3) -50 (All collected data has been purged. JSC 3024(2) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)		(b) (1) (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36
	occurred because the coordinate with SIGINT analysts		d not
	reports were issued. the SIGINT analysts are now coordinating with		a
(b) (1) (b) (3)	-P.L. 86-36	Derived From: NSA/C Dated:	CSSM 1-52 20070108

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DOCID	: 4165219	
(b) (1)	TOP SECRET//SI//TALENT KEYHOLE//NOFORN	(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
(b) (3) -I	2.L. 86-36	(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)
	(4) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) it was discovered	that a tasked
\	selector for an e-mail account believed to be used by a foreign target	The selection
\	was detasked and no reports were issued.	(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
\		(b)(3)-18 USC 798 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)
	(5) (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA/analy	(b)(3)-10 USC 3024(i)
	Targeting of personnel was aut	thorized as long as
	one end of the collection is outside the United States; however, upon further re-	esearch, the analyst
	determined that both ends of the collection were in the United States. Non-co	mpliant data was
	purged	
		alyst learned that
	unauthorized collection had occurred during a survey operation and training e	
	misunderstanding between NSA headquarters and an NSA field unit about act request to disseminate collected data led to the discovery that unauthorized co	* * * *
	occurred. All e-mails containing the unauthorized data were deleted	To
	avoid future occurrences, an approved Concept of Operations for training and	collection
o)(1) o)(3)-P.L.	operations is required.	
-, (-,		e test of a collection
	system, a developer inadvertently collected data that included U.S. telephone	numbers. The
	error occurred because the developer The developer deleted the c	collected data and
[Fire developer defected the c	
•		(b) (1) (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36
	I.A.1.b. (U) Database Queries	(b) (3) -50 USC 3024(i)
	(1) -(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)	
	(2) (U// FOUO) On occasions during the third quarter, analysts per	rformed overly
	broad or poorly constructed database queries that potentially sought or returne	
	about USPs. These queries used	
	results. On of those occasions, the queries returned results, which were d	uced imprecise
	as required, and no reports were issued. Analysts who performed these querie	9
	by the ir management.	
	(II) Proceedings and other arrang contributed to the following incidents	(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
	(U) Procedural and other errors contributed to the following incidents:	
	• (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) On occasions during the third quarter	
	performed queries in raw traffic databases without first conducting the	necessary research

⁽b) (1) (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

(b) (1) (b) (3)-P.L. 86-	36	
(5)(3) 1.11. 00	on the selectors. When the queries returned results, they were deleted and no reports were issued.	
•	(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) During a routine database audit NSA database developers were discovered to have unknowingly run multiple queries in a database	
(b) (1)	while performing software testing on a new database, the developers ran the queries multiple times because software flaws prevented the queries from executing properly. No results were returned. To prevent future errors, the developers will test queries using that have been verified	
(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36 (b) (3) -50 USC 302	beforehand.	
[(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) a SIGINT analyst mistakenly ran queries in raw traffic databases on selectors associated with a USP because the analyst believed that the target, a USP, The selectors were detasked reports were cancelled; of them were reissued with the USP information	
'	masked. (b) (1) (b) (3) -P.L. 86-3	36
• -	(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) a software developer was discovered to have performed a query in a raw traffic database using a query string that contained No results were returned by the query. The developer was counseled to be more careful when selecting text for testing.	30
(b) (1)	(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA database auditor learned that an analyst had run a query in the incorrect raw SIGINT database The Squery was stopped before returning results. The analyst was counseled.	
	(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA database auditor discovered that, as the result of a software failure, a query was run in a raw traffic database against	
	the query results were deleted. No reports were issued.	
• \	(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) because of an error in the interface of a raw traffic database, an analyst performed a query that did not contain the e-mail address he had entered in the search field. As a result, the query returned a large number of results, which were deleted. The problem was reported to the database team to make changes to the interface to prevent future errors.	
•	(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) while conducting a test, an NSA database developer unknowingly executed queries against SIGINT data. A software flaw altered the query Upon discovery of the software flaw, the query function was disabled until the software was updated to fix the problem. (b) (1) (b) (3) -P.L. 86-3	36
•	(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) during a test software, a software tester unknowingly performed queries against raw SIGINT. of the queries contained A software flaw allowed the	

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(b) (1) (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

queries to be executed against raw SIGINT. The system automatically deleted the queries and results. The software has been updated, and the flaw has been fixed.

•	(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) after returning from a month-long class,
	an NSA analyst learned that associated with a valid foreign
	target was in the United States
	The selectors had been detasked
	The analyst deleted the
	query results and no reports were issued. The analyst was counseled to
	before extended absences from the office.
•	(TS//SI//NF) an NSA database auditor discovered that an analyst had
	queried on a selector associated with a U.S. military in a raw traffic database on
	The query returned results, which were
	deleted The analyst's database access was temporarily suspended. In
	addition, the analyst was counseled on the proper querying techniques and instructed to
	retake intelligence oversight training. (b) (1)
	(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36
•	(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst queried without
	authorization on the selector associated with a
	The error occurred because the analyst believed that the selector was an alternate
	selector for a valid foreign target. The query returned results, which were deleted; no
	reports were issued. The analystto prevent
	future targeting.
	(TS//SI//NF) an NSA analyst improperly performed a query on a
•	selector authorized under a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) Order in the
	incorrect raw traffic database. No results were returned by the query. The analyst was
	counseled to perform queries on FISC-authorized selectors
	approved databases.
	approved databases.
•	(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst discovered that a
	query of a valid foreign target in a raw SIGINT database when
	the target was known to be in the United States. The analyst
	had detasked the target's e-mail selector
	and no results were returned; no reports were
	issued the analyst was counseled
(b) (I)	
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-	-36
•	(TS//SI//NF) an NSA analyst performed queries on a U.S.
	organization in a raw traffic database without formal authorization because the analyst
	incorrectly believed that he was authorized to query due to a potential threat. No results
	were returned by the query. The analyst was counseled that targeting or querying USPs
	was not permitted without formal authorization.

•	a SIGINT analyst inadvertently queried on a U.S. telephone selector in a raw traffic database. The analyst deleted the query No results were returned by the query.
· //	a SIGINT analyst performed a query in using a selector that was associated with a USP. The targeting error occurred because the analyst had failed before querying. The analyst halted the query before it returned any results.
))(1)))(3)-P.L. 86-36	(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) after copying several selectors into a query in a raw traffic database, a SIGINT analyst realized that one of the selectors was associated with a USP. Upon realizing the error, the analyst deleted the query. (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)
	an NSA analyst performed a query in a raw traffic database using a selector associated with a USP. The analyst deleted the query and results and no reports were issued. The analyst was reminded that querying on USP selectors without authorization is prohibited and that query results returned by the unauthorized query must be deleted.
•	(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst discovered that a software flaw had allowed a query Upon discovering that the query returned a larger number of results than expected, the analyst canceled the query and deleted the results without viewing them. The analyst reported the software problem to the database
•	developers to develop a patch. (b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i) authorization a query in a raw SIGINT database on a selector associated with a USP While trying to verify the status of the target, the analyst queried the raw traffic database
	To avoid future errors, No results were returned.
•	NSA analysts performed queries in raw traffic databases on selectors associated with valid foreign targets that included the dates when the targets were known to be in the United States. queries returned results, which were deleted; no reports were issued. (b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
•	(TS//SI//NF) a SIGINT analyst ran a query on a previously detasked selector that had been determined to be a USP. The query returned results, which were
	deleted.

•	an NSA analyst performed a query on a selector
	associated with a USP that contained a date range not covered by the approved
	consensual collection agreement. The analyst included the period of
(A)	instead of the intended period of The error
(1) (3)-P.L. 86-36	occurred because the analyst believed that the database
No. of the second	The query results were deleted and no reports were
	issued
/ / ///.	(S//SI//REL TO USA FVEY) an NSA database auditor discovered
	that an analyst had performed queries in a raw traffic database without
	to exclude USP data. The error occurred because the analyst incorrectly believed that
	The analyst deleted the query results The auditor
\	advised the analyst to ensure that had been implemented properly by
\	the interface before querying.
\	the interface before querying.
\• .	(S//SI//REL_TO USA, FVEY) an analyst conducted a query that
\	contained selectors associated with targets in the United States. Non-compliant data
\	was deleted, and the analyst was counseled on proper query procedures.
\	
3)(1)	(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst mistakenly performed
o)(3)-P.L. 86-36	a query in a raw SIGINT database No results were returned.
o)(3)-50 USC 3024	\ \
•	(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA database auditor discovered
	that queries had been conducted in a raw SIGINT database
	The analyst was counseled. No reporting or dissemination resulted.
•	(TS//SI//NF) an NSA analyst mistakenly queried in a raw traffic
	database on the selector associated with a USP. Upon realizing the error, the analyst
	deleted the query results. No dissemination occurred. (b) (1)
	(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36
•	(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst gueried on his own
	personal identifier in a raw traffic database because the analyst was unfamiliar with the
	database interface and was not aware that he was searching against raw traffic. The
	analyst was provided training on proper querying techniques.
• •	(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA database auditor discovered that
	an analyst had queried in a raw traffic database on
	were accidentally included among the search terms in the query.
	The analyst was counseled. No results were returned, and no reports were issued.
	(S//SI//REL_TO USA, FVEY) an analyst queried on selectors
_	associated with a foreign intelligence target known to be in the United States because the
	analyst entered an incorrect date range for the query. The analyst was counseled, and the
	results were deleted.
	(b)(1)
	(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

•	(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA database auditor
	discovered that an analyst had queried in a raw traffic database on
/	The query returned no results.
•	(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) while responding to a request for information, an analyst queried raw traffic databases on a selector associated with a foreign intelligence target while the target was in the United States. The requester did not include in the request information the United States the analyst deleted results returned by queries, and no reports were issued.
	(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst learned that a
(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36	selector on which he had performed queries in raw traffic databases was associated with a USP. The queries and results were deleted. No reports were issued.
	an NSA analyst queried without appropriate FISA authorization on an untasked selector associated with Although an FISC Order exists, neither the target nor the selector was included in the order. the analyst was counseled on
(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)	the restrictions for querying on selectors not authorized under FISA authority. No reports were issued.
	(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) after discovering the foreign target's the United States, an NSA analyst continued to perform a query in a raw traffic database to determine whether the target was in the United States. The analyst was counseled about reviewing selectors and promptly detasking them after
(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36	(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) a SIGINT analyst queried selectors associated with a foreign intelligence target when the target was known to be in the United States the analyst requested detasking of all selectors. The analyst deleted the query and results
*##	(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst mistakenly performed a query in the incorrect raw traffic database using selectors associated with a USP.
(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36	
(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(Upon discovery of the error, the analyst stopped the query and deleted all query results. No dissemination occurred.
•	(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) NSA analysts discovered that on selectors for foreign intelligence targets while the targets were in the United States because queries
	canceled the queries and deleted the results; no reports were issued. To prevent future

	error, a new procedure was developed (b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
	TS//SI/NF) an NSA analyst discovered that on a selector associated with a FISA-approved target had continued to run beyond the period of the FISC Order. The error occurred because the analyst, who was unfamiliar with the database,
	No reports were issued.
	• (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) while conducting a test, an NSA database developer performed queries in a raw traffic database on selectors that The query results were not stored. (b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)
	(1) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst discovered that the selectors associated with valid foreign targets had remained on task when the targets were in the United States. The error occurred because the analyst had overlooked information the analyst detasked the selectors. No reports were issued.
(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86	associated with a valid foreign target had remained on task when the target was in the United States because the analyst was away from the office for long-term training. The analyst was advised to detask selectors before extended absences from the office.
	(3) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst discovered that a selector associated with a valid foreign target had remained on task while the target was in the United States because the the selector was detasked and the results were deleted. No reports were issued. The analyst was counseled on immediate detasking procedures.
ı	(4) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an analyst discovered that selectors associated with a valid foreign intelligence target had remained on task while the target was in the United States.
	The selectors were detasked . Non-compliant data has been purged, and no reports were issued.
	(5) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) the selectors associated with a foreign target remained on task when the target entered the United States on the delay occurred because an Intelligence Community agency analyst did not the NSA analyst detasked the selectors.
(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 8	No reports were issued

(c) (q)(q)(l)PPI TO IIQA PUPYI
(6) (S//SI//REL_TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst discovered that
collection had occurred associated with a valid foreign target, even
though the selectors had been detasked
The collection was attributed to a processing error
that resulted in the detask request not being processed
the selector was detasked and non-compliant data was purged. No reports
were issued. (b)(1)
(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
(7) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst discovered that
associated with a valid foreign target had remained on task after the target had
entered the United States on The analyst
after Tearning hat the target was in the United States but
selector
was detasked. No data was collected.
(0) (C//CI//DEL TO LICA EMPM)
(8) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) selectors associated with a
valid foreign target were discovered to have remained on task while the target was in the United
States. the analyst
another analyst discovered
and detasked them. The results were deleted, and no reports were issued.
(9) (S//SI//REL-TO-USA, FVEY) after discovering that a valid
foreign target the United States, an NSA analyst detasked
another analyst discovered
No non-compliant data was collected, and no reports were issued. The analyst
was counseled to check selectors associated with a target when detasking
(D)(1)
(10) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) An NSA analyst discovered that (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
associated with a valid foreign target had remained on task when the target was in the United
States from
the analyst had failed to detask this selector. The analyst deleted the
collection associated No reports were issued.
$(11)\frac{1}{1}$
(11) (S//SI//REL-TO USA, FVEY) (b)(1) 86-36
8 USC 798
0 USC 3024(
<u> </u>
(12) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst discovered that
selectors associated with a valid foreign target had remained on task while the target was in
the United States after learning that the target had traveled to the United
States on the analyst detasked selectors which remained on
task until Confusion about whether the data required purging resulted in a delay in
The state of the s
(b)(1)
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

purging. The analyst submitted a purge request for non-compliant data	No
reports were issued.	
(13) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst discovered	
selectors associated with a valid foreign target had remained on task while the target w	as in
the United States. and detasking associated selectors the analyst learned that	
selectors selectors selectors	ors
were detasked. No non-compliant data was collected, and no reports were issued.	
(14) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst discove	(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
that one selector associated with a valid foreign target had remained on task while the target	t was
in the United States. The analyst first became aware the target	
United States After conducting further research	
analyst found that the target's e-mail selector was still tasked. The analyst detasked the sel	ector
on and no reports were issued.	
(15) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) NSA analysts	
discovered that selectors associated with valid foreign targets had remained on t	
while the targets were in the United States. detask request of the sel	ectors
the United States, collection occurred on the selectors. Upon discovery of the collection, the analysts detasked the selectors and deleted	(b)(1)
discovery of the conection, the analysis detasked the selectors and defered	(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
(16) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) selectors associated	with
a valid foreign target were discovered to have remained on task while the target was in the	// \
United States. The delay occurred because the analyst mistakenly believed that	l he
selector was detasked. No reports were issued. The analyst was counseled	
(17) (S//SI//REL_TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst discove	rod
that a selector associated with a valid foreign target had remained on task while the target v	
the United States. Although	
the target's selectors remained on task	
The delay occurred because the analysts responsible for tasking were on leave or temporary	alide .
No reports were issued.	(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
(18) (TS//SI//NF) NSA analysts discovered that coll	
occurred on selectors associated with valid foreign targe	ts \
despite detask that had been requested in the United States. The error occurred because	was
not aware of the detask requests. All non-compliant data was deleted, and no reports were	was
issued.	
(10) (CUCHTORIL TO LICA EVENA VALUE	1
(19) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst discover that selectors had remained on task after the expiration of a consensual collection requestion.	
The delay in detasking occurred because the analyst was not aware that	

DOCID (b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86 (b)(3)-50 USC		
	No collection on these selectors occurred. The selectors were detasked	
11	(20) (TS//SI//NF) an NSA analyst discovered that sassociated with valid foreign targets had remained on task while the targets were in United States	/n\/1\
	was notified about the selectors that were to be detasked, and selectors were detasked No collection resulted from the selector reports were issued.	
	I.A.2 (U)	(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-18 USC 798 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)
_	(1) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)	
_	(2) (TS//SI//NF)	
	I.A.3 (U) Unauthorized Access	
	(1) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) two analysts accessed rates from a location not approved for that access. The analysts were counseled to access rate only from approved locations.	
	(2) (S//SI//REL TO USA; FVEY) raw SIGINT data was files accessible to NSA personnel who did not have the appropriate training and were rauthorized to view the data. The data was moved to files for which all personnel with the required training.	s stored in ot
	I.A.4 (U) Data-Handling Error	
	(1) (S//REL-TO-USA, FVEY) On six occasions analysts disseminated raw SIGINT in e-mails to IC agency analysts and other external not authorized to receive the information. The e-mails were deleted, and all analysts we counseled.	
_	(2) (TS//SI//NF)	(b)(1)
[(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)

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(b)(1)(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)

	(3) (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst passed raw SIGINT data to a database without minimizing the U.S. identities. The data was recalled
20 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2	(4) (TS//SI//NF) NSA personnel revealed the names of USPs to individuals not authorized to receive the information. They were counseled on procedures for disseminating USP identities.
1) 3)-P.L	. 86–36(5) (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) NSA analysts disseminated raw SIGINT in an e-mail to recipients not authorized to receive the information because analysts used an incorrect alias that included the names of analysts from external organizations. the analyst recalled the e-mails. the analyst sent a follow-up e-mail to inform recipients to delete the e-mail.
	(6) (TS//SI//NF) in response to a request for information, an NSA analyst disseminated in an e-mail to an IC customer not authorized to see the information a selector associated with a USP. the analyst requested that the e-mail be deleted. The analyst was counseled on proper minimization procedures.
	I.B. (U) Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)
	I.B.1. (U) NSA/CSS Title I FISA
	I.B.1.a. (U) Detasking Delays
	an NSA analyst discovered that a telephone selector associated with a valid foreign target had not been detasked Although the analyst responsible for the telephone selector had failed to submit a request for detasking. The selector was detasked No reports were issued. No reports were issued. (b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L.
	I.B.1.b. (U) Unauthorized Targeting
ı	(1) (TS//SI//NF)

***************************************	all communication s collected on these selectors were requested to be purged. No reports were issued.
	(2) (TS//SI//NF)

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(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 8	an NSA analyst discovered that coccurred on a target authorized under a FISC Order before the approved date	ollection had
	Non-compliant data was deleted and no report NSA has taken steps to ensure that operational plans are properly reviewed and ap	s were issued. proved.
1	(4) (TS//SI//NF) an NSA analyst discovered that a associated with a valid foreign target had remained tasked after the target had department of the states.	
1	the analyst detasked the sel submitted a purge request for the collected data. No reports were issued. To prevoccurrences, to ensure that selectors departing the United States are detasked timely.	ent future
	I.B.1.c. (U) Unauthorized Retention	
	an NSA analyst discovered that data collection for the authorized retention period. The data was purged, and no reports were issued, was counseled on retention procedures.	than The analyst (b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
) (1)	I.B.1.d. (U) Unauthorized Access	(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)
The state of the s	they were not authorized to access.	uthority that
l	The problem will be fixed in a future softward. I.B.1.e. (U) Data-Handling Errors	re upaate.
Γ	(1) (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) a Branch Chief discovered FISA data had been disseminated imp	
	e-mail to a distribution list that contained the names of two individuals not authorithe information. The e-mails were recalled, and the analyst was counseled on propolassification markings.	zed to receive
	(2) (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA contractor not access to FISA data recovered a FISA document from a printer in a contractor authorized for FISA data. Another contractor, who was authorized for FISA data, the document four times because he believed that the printing had been unsuccessful.	SCIF not had printed

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remained on the printer until they were discovered by the contractor. A second contractor, who also believed that printing had been unsuccessful, forwarded the document in an e-mail to a third contractor. All copies of the document were retrieved and destroyed.

	I.B.2. (S//REL-TO USA, FVEY)	(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)
	I.B.2.a. (U) Data-Handling Error	
[(S//SI//REL_TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst forwarded information in an e-mail to analyst no longer authorized to receive the information the NSA analyst confirmed that the e-mail had been deleted.	ation.
		.L. 86-36
	(U) Nothing to report.	
	I.B.4. (U) FISA Amendments Act (FAA) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36	
	I.B.4.a. (U) FAA Section 702	
	(U// FOUO) NSA/CSS has implemented a new process to ensure that FAA §702 dat required to be purged is purged from NSA/CSS databases. NSA created a	a I
ſ	to identify non-	
	compliant data that should be purged.	
	I.B.4.a.i. (U) Tasking Errors	
	(1) (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst discovered the selector had been tasked in error. An IC analyst had made a typo graphical error in the select and passed the incorrect selector for tasking to the NSA analyst. the analyst detasked the incorrect selector and submitted the correct selector for tasking. No collection occurred.	ctor yst
	(2) (TS//SI//REL_TO USA, FVEY) select were incorrectly tasked because of typographical errors. The selectors were detasked, and information has been purged. No reports were issued.	(b)(1) or(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 the
	(3) (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst discovered the selectors had been improperly tasked because there was insufficient information to verify the targets were located outside the United States. Additional information was provided to compliant data collected on the selectors has been purged. (4) (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst discovered the	hat the rect Von-
	selector had been tasked in error because the target did not meet the criteria of the FAA 870	

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)

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1	certification. the selector was detasked. Non-compliant data has been purged, and no reports were issued.
and the same of th	(5) (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst discovered that an e-mail selector for a valid foreign target had been tasked incorrectly because the e-mail address The incorrect selector was associated with a USP. It was detasked, and non-compliant data was purged. No reports were issued. (b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
The state of the s	(6) (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst discovered that a selector for a valid foreign target had been tasked incorrectly. An IC agency analyst mistakenly believed that The incorrect selector was determined to be associated with a USP and was detasked. Non-compliant data has been purged, and no reports were issued.
	(7) (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst discovered that a foreign target's selector had been improperly tasked under FAA §702 because targeting procedures were not followed. The selector was detasked because of the (b)(1) target's travel to the United States; The selector was detasked
	Non-compliant data has been purged, and no reports were issued. (8) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst discovered that a selector associated with a valid foreign intelligence target had been improperly approved for tasking
	The selector was detasked No collection occurred. (b)(1) (9) (TS://SI://NF) an NSA analyst learned that selectors for a (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 foreign target had been erroneously tasked because not authorized under the FAA §702 certification. Upon recognition of the error, the analyst detasked the selectors. No collection occurred.
	(10) (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) a selector had been improperly tasked under FAA §702 authority targeting procedures had not been followed. and two reports were canceled. selector remained on a dual-route to an IC customer. Non-compliant data collected has been purged.
	(11) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst discovered that a selector associated with a foreign target had been tasked incorrectly. The selector was detasked, and non-compliant data has been purged. No reports were issued.

I.B.4.a.ii. (U) Database Queries

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(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)

	(1) (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) On occasions in the third quarter, analysts performed in FAA §702 data collection overly broad or poorly constructed database queries that potentially targeted and returned information about USPs. These queries used
	returned results from the database. The results were deleted or aged off, as required, and no reports were issued. Analysts who performed these queries were counseled by their management.
(b) (3)-P.	(2) (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst performed in a raw traffic database queries on a selector associated with a USP the results were deleted. No reports were issued.
	(3) (TS//SI//NF) On occasions NSA analysts improperly queried on the selectors associated with FAA §704/705(b) USP targets in FAA §702 aw traffic databases.
0)(1)	The analysts were counseled on the procedures for querying on FAA §704/705(b) targets in raw traffic databases. The queries and results were deleted.
o)(3)-P.L. 86	an NSA database auditor discovered that an analyst had performed an improper query in a raw traffic database. While conducting research on the selector before querying, the analyst noted that the target's e-mail account Although aware that OGC approval was required for the analyst missed that information while conducting
	(5) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst mistakenly (b) (1) performed a query in a raw traffic database on selectors that had been detasked because (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 the United States. The analyst intended to check the tasking tool but queried the raw traffic database instead. The selectors were detasked and non-compliant data has been purged. No reports were issued.
	(6) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst discovered that a selector associated with a valid foreign intelligence target remained on task after the target had arrived in the United States. While conducting research on the selector, the analyst performed a query in a raw traffic database when the target was known to be in the United States the selector was detasked. Non-compliant data was purged, and no reports were issued.
	I.B.4.a.iii. (U) Detasking Delays
ſ	(1) (TS//SI//NF) an NSA analyst detasked (b)(1) associated with a target who had entered the United States, but (3)-P.L. 86-36
İ	The selectors were detasked, and non-compliant data has been purged.

(2) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) a selector associated with a valid
foreign intelligence target was discovered to have remained on task after the target had arrived in
the United States. the analyst
made a typographical error in the detask request and the selector remained on task
All non-compliant data has been purged, and no reports were issued. (b)(1)
(3) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst reported that a (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
selector associated with a valid foreign intelligence target had remained on task after the target had arrived in the United States.
the analyst had failed to detask the selector. The selector was detasked
and non-compliant data has been purged. No reports were issued.
(4) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst discovered that
selectors associated with a foreign target remained on task after the target had entered the United States.
the selector was confirmed to have been detasked, and non-
compliant data has been purged. No reports were issued.
(5) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst discovered that
selectors associated with a valid foreign intelligence target remained on task after the target had
arrived in the United States.
the selectors were
detasked, and non-compliant data has been purged. No reports were issued. (b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
(6) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) a selector for a valid foreign target
was discovered to have been overlooked when
because of the target's arrival in the United States. The selector was detasked
Non-compliant data has been purged, and no reports were issued.
Twon-compitant data has been purged, and no reports were issued.
(7) (TS//SI//NF) an NSA analyst learned that a selector had remained
on task even though it had been determined that the target was a USP the
selector was detasked No collection occurred, and no reports were issued (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-18 USC 798
(8) (TS//SI//NF) an NSA analyst discovered that select(th)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)
associated with a valid foreign intelligence target remained on task after the target
The detask delay occurred because the analyst was out of the office and there
was no back-up the analyst confirmed that the
b)(1) selectors were detasked, and non-compliant data has been purged.
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
(9) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an analyst failed to timely detask
selectors associated with valid foreign targets, which were in the United States
the selectors were detasked. No collection occurred.
(10) (C//CI//DEL TO LICA EVEV) on NSA analyst discovered that a
(10) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst discovered that a
selector associated with a foreign target had remained on task when the target was in the United
Statesthe analyst
(b)(1)
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

	did not detask the United States. the selector
	was detasked, and non-compliant data has been purged. No reports were issued.
	(11) (TS//SI//NF) selectors associated with a valid foreign (b)(1)
	intelligence target were discovered to have remained on task Because of an oversight, the analyst did not see the request to (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
	detask all selectors associated with the target because the target was in the United States. The
	alternate selectors were detasked and non-compliant data has been purged. No reports were issued.
	(12) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) An NSA analyst failed to detask selectors associated
	with two foreign targets known to be traveling in the United States from The selectors for both targets were detasked and non-compliant data has
	been purged.
	(13) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst discovered
	that a selector for a valid foreign target had been tasked incorrectly (b)(1)
	No collection occurred. The selector was detail (3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-18 USC 798
	(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)
	(14) (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst discovered
	that a selector associated with a foreign target had remained on task when the target entered the United States. Although detasking had been requested the
/	analyst had overlooked detasking the selector the selector was detasked,
b)(1)	and non-compliant data has been purged. No reports were issued.
b)(3)-P.L.	86-36 (15) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst discovered
	that selector associated with a valid foreign target remained on task The
	analyst detasked the telephone selector after learning that the target
1	While conducting further research on the selector, the analyst also
\\	discovered that the target was a USP. The delay in detasking occurred because The selector was detasked
'	and all non-compliant data has been purged.
	(16) (S//SI//REL_TO USA, FVEY) because of a
	miscommunication between analysts, selectors associated with valid foreign targets
1	remained on task even though the United States. The delay in detasking occurred because
	that the targets had
/	entered the United States. The analysts were counseled to conduct thorough research to find
/	selectors associated with the targets and detask accordingly. Non-compliant data has been purged. (b)(1)
/	(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
***************************************	(17) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) An NSA analyst failed to detask selector associated with a foreign target even though
***************************************	the United States The error occurred because
(b)(1)	

The analyst
detasked the selector Non-compliant data has been purged, and no
reports were issued. To prevent future errors,
and require that a second analyst review the selectors. (b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
(18) (S//SI//REL_TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst discove <u>red</u>
that the selector associated with a valid foreign target remained on task even though because the target had
entered the United States. The error occurred because
was not shared with the analyst. Non-compliant data has been purged, and no
reports were issued. To prevent future errors, will be sent to multiple analysts.
I.B.4.a.iv. (U) Data-Handling Errors
(1) (S//SI//REL-TO-USA, FVEY) after completing an IO training course, an NSA analyst realized that he had disseminated FAA §702 data in an e-mail to three analysts not authorized to receive the data. All e-mails were deleted
(2) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) it was discovered that an NSA analyst had disseminated FAA §702 raw data by posting the data on internal NSA web pages in accessible to analysts not authorized to receive the data. The non-compliant data was removed and a request was submitted to remove the web pages.
(3) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an analyst forwarded FAA data to a group e-mail address containing personnel not authorized to receive the data. The error occurred because the e-mail classification tool changed the classification to remove the restriction for FAA data. the e-mail was recalled.
(4) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA database developer forwarded a file containing FAA §702 data to another developer who was not authorized to receive it. Upon realizing that the file contained FAA §702 data, the developer deleted the data from his mailbox. All members of the development team have since received the briefings on handling FAA §702 data. (b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
(5) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst disseminated FAA §702 data in an e-mail to another analyst who was not authorized to receive the information. The second analyst saved the data in a file in the home directory, which is not approved to store this type of data. The e-mail and file were deleted.
(6) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) an NSA analyst reported that in he had forwarded FAA §702 data to a forward-deployed coworker not authorized to receive the data. The analyst delayed reporting the incident for fear that the coworker would be removed from the deployment. The analyst was counseled on the methods to check clearances before sharing raw SIGINT data.
(7) (TS//SI//NF) an NSA division manager discovered that notes based on had been shared with analyst not authorized to receive the data. The error was attributed to a lack

	of a standardized process for sharing informal working notes and the provision of an NSA e-mail account to analyst who was not operating under SIGINT authorities. The manager informed analyst that the notes must be deleted and had the analyst removed from the e-mail alias for notes.
	(8) (S//SI//REL_TO USA, FVEY) an analyst unknowingly forwarded FAA §702 data to a group e-mail address containing personnel not authorized to receive the data. data was removed from the servers and the analyst was counseled on the appropriate alias to use.
	T.B.4.a.v. (U) Overcollection
o)(1) o)(3)-P.L. 8	(1) (TS://SI://REL TO USA, FVEY) during a regular review of E.O.
	NSA has deployed a short-term solution to address the problem and is continuing work on a long-term solution. See the summary of the Congressional Notification on page 23.
	(2)-(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) NSA collection managers learned that
	Non-compliant data has
	been marked for purging. Work on a resolution to the problem is ongoing
	(b)(1) (B)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(ii
	I.B.4.b.i. (U) Data Handling Errors
	(TS//SI//NF) it was discovered that.
	The data flow error has been corrected to prevent future incidents.
	LB.4.b.ji. (U) Database Query Errors (b)(1)
	(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (TS//SI//NF) an NSA analyst discovered that another analyst had
	an NSA analyst discovered that another analyst had performed a query in a raw traffic database analyst discovered the error when the original query was amended and he noticed a significant decrease in the number of results. The analyst deleted the query and the results
	I.B.4.c. (U) FAA Section 705(b)
	I.B.4.c.i. (U) Data-Handling Errors

(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) On occasions SIGINT operator posted on selectors authorized under FISA §705(b) into a that was not approved for FISA data. Upon realizing the mistake, the analyst posted requesting that all notes and records be deleted.	
I.B.4.c.ii. (U) Tasking Error	(b)(1)
I.B.4.c.iii. (U) Detasking Delay	(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
an NSA auditor discovered that a que authorized under FAA §705(b) after the Court Order had expirate the selectors were detasked.	-
the analyst was counseled and the query was deleted.	
I.C. (U) Consensual Collection	
(U) Nothing to report.	
I.D. (U) Dissemination of U.S. Identities	
(TS//SI//NF) The NSA/CSS enterprise issued SIGINT product report third quarter of CY2012. In SIGINT products, disseminations were found to be and the reports were canceled as NSA/CSS and analysts learned U.S. organizations, or U.S. entities named without authorization. All data in the care was deleted as required, and the reports were not re-issued or were re-issued with priminimization.	improper, ed of USPs, aceled reports
I.E. (U) Counterintelligence Activities	(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
(U) Nothing to report.	
I.F. (U) Detection and Prevention of Violations	(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
(1) (TS//SI//NF) To reduce the risk of unauthorized telephony collection and priviolations, NSA/CSS has instituted a process that gives analysts greater and faster in target's location.	
from NSA/CSS's principal raw traffic repositories when required.	s purged
(2) (TS//SI//NF)	1
NSA analysts found e-mail accounts	
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in the third quarter. Collected data was purged from NSA/CSS's principal raw traffic repositories when required.
(b)(1) (I.G. (U) Other (b)(3)-P.L. 86-
(U//FOUO) In two instances, database accesses were not terminated when analysts were deployed or reassigned to another site. Although not considered violations of E.O. 12333 or related directives, the accesses were terminated.
II. (U) NSA/CSS Office of the Inspector General (OIG) IO Inspections, Investigations, and Special Studies
(U// FOUO) During the third quarter of CY2012, the OIG reviewed various NSA/CSS intelligence activities to determine whether they had been conducted in accordance with statutes, E.O.s, AG procedures, and Department of Defense and internal directives. The problems uncovered were routine and showed that operating elements understand the restrictions on NSA/CSS activities.
II.A. (U) NSA/CSS Representative
(U/FOUO) As part of an NSA/CSS OIG field inspection of NCR an IO inspector reviewed the implementation of the IO program, IO training, and application of IO standards in the SIGINT mission activities performed at the site. The inspector found that the site lacked an IO Officer (IOO) structure that ensured the proper handling, minimization, and dissemination of raw SIGINT data. The inspector also found that not all personnel were compliant with the training requirements. The OIG recommended that an IOO structure be established that complies with current SIGINT policies and procedures and ensures adherence to training requirements. (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
(U//FOUO) As part of an NSA/CSS OIG field inspection of the an IO inspector reviewed IO program management, IO training, IO knowledge, and the application of IO standards in mission activities. The inspector found that the site did not have procedures to ensure that database accesses were properly terminated after personnel left the site, and it did not conduct periodic reviews. Not all personnel had completed the mandatory IO training. The OIG recommended that the site develop and implement processes for timely access termination, perform periodic reviews, register all IOOs as mission auditors, and ensure that training is tracked and completed. II.C. (TS//SI//NF) Report on NSA Controls to Comply with the FISC Order
Regarding Business Records (BR) Collection (b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
the OIG published the results of a special study of NSA controls to comply with the FISC Order regarding BR collection. an OIG auditor performed testing and procedural reviews to assess the Agency's compliance and found that, except for one incident reported during the review, no incidents of

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non-compliance had occurred during CY2011. The auditor made recommendations for improvement to BR processes to strengthen controls and reduce the risk of non-compliance.

II.D. (U)	IO Program
-(S//RI	the OIG conducted a review of(b)(1)
the IO P	rogram at the (b)(3)-P.L. 86-
	is under the operational and technical
	Director of NSA In a report published the OIG evaluators
	weaknesses in the IO program, including a lack of centralized management of IO
activities and	internal controls.
II.E. (U) Rep	ort on the
	(b) (1)
	(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
(S//SI/	(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)
L	OIG participation, conducted a study of which is
owned and m	
data acquired	
report, publisl	found weaknesses in controls for handling and protecting SIGINT data. The included recommendations to address the weaknesses.
report, publisi	icu
II.F. (U) Mis	use of the U.S. SIGINT System
` '	(b)(1)
(U) N	othing to report (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
II.O. (II) O a	
II.G. (U) Co	ngressional and IO Board Notifications
(1) (TS//SI//N	NSA/CSS notified the Congressional intelligence
	bout an overcollection of FAA §702 upstream collection as well as collection under
other authoriti	ies. (b)(1)
	P.L. 86-36
	50 USC 3024(i)
	NSA has
1 2	ort-term solution to address the problem and is continuing work on a long-term
solution.	
(2) -(T	NSA/CSS notified the Congressional intelligence
	NSA/CSS notified the Congressional intelligence bout the unauthorized disclosure of classified national security information derived
from SIGINT	Jour the unauthorized disclosure of classified hadonal security information derived
nom signiti	<u>'</u>
as well as lim	it NSA's access to other sensitive communications in the long term. NSA's OGC
	imes Report with the Department of Justice.
	(b)(1)
	(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
P.L. 86-36	(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)

assertant /	b)(1) b)(3)-P.L. 86-36		
II.F. (U) Other Notifications	0)(0) 1 .2. 00 00		
(TS//SI/NF) NSA/CSS notified the AG of intelligence-related collection active associated with USP hostage and detainee cases.	rities		
III. (U) Substantive Changes to the NSA/CSS IO Program			
(U//FOUO) To improve its management and understanding of the rules and interpretations of FISA-related authorities, NSA has established an effort known as "Rules Management" to manage, organize, and maintain the authorities, policies, and compliance requirements that govern NSA mission activities. One of the key components of this effort focused on technological solutions to support and simplify rules management. Two system have been created to provide searchable databases that NSA personnel can use to find authoritative documents for NSA's FISA activities, as well as implementing guidance. One database is operational, and the system containing the more advanced document management and search capabilities is in development.	s		
$IV.\ (U)$ Changes to NSA/CSS Published Directives or Policies Concerning Intelligence, Counterintelligence, or Intelligence-Related Activities and the Reason for the Changes			
(U) Nothing to report.			
V. (U) Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect USP (DoD Directive 5240.1-R, Procedure 15) Inquiries or Matters Related to IO Programs			
(U) Nothing to report.			
VI. (U) Crimes Reporting			
(U) Nothing to Report			
VII. (U) Other Matters			
(S//NF) The NSA OIG is investigating an allegation that activity associated with a			
	(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)		